

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 EA-07 ISO-00 IO-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 ACDA-05 ERDA-05 NASA-01 OES-03 EB-07 COME-00

TRSE-00 XMB-02 AGR-05 OMB-01 /105 W

----- 043420

P R 071122Z NOV 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4184

INFO USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMCONSUL BREMEN

AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF

AMCONSUL FRANKFURT

AMCONSUL HAMBURG

AMCONSUL STUTTGART

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 18230

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GW. CH

SUBJECT: SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO CHINA

REFS: (A) BONN 16897 NOTAL; (B) BONN 17074 (NOTAL);

(C) HONG KONG 13117 NOTAL; (D) HONO KONG 12942

NOTAL

BEGIN SUMMARY: CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO CHINA

OCTOBER 29-NOVEMBER 2 WAS A LIMITED SUCCESS. HE WAS

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RECEIVED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AND SEVERAL ROUTINE

AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED. SCHMIDT WAS EXPOSED TO A HIGH DEGREE OF ANTI-SOVIET RHETORIC FROM THE CHINESE AND MAY HAVE IRRITATED THE USSR BY VISITING SINKIANG. LITTLE NEW GROUND WAS BROKEN. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VISIT REMAINS UNCLEAR AS MAY ITS WISDOM IF IT HAS PROVOKED THE SOVIETS. IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT THE FRG IS READY YET TO PLAY WORLD POLITICS AT THE LEVEL OF ANY KIND OF SINO-SOVIET BALANCING ACT. END SUMMARY.

1. THE FOREIGN OFFICE HAS TOLD US THAT SCHMIDT'S VISIT WENT AS EXPECTED. HE FOLLOWED THE PROGRAM OUTLINED IN REFTELS (A) AND (B) AND WAS RECEIVED BY MAO FOR A LENGTHY CONVERSATION WHICH THE CHANCELLOR ENJOYED THOROUGHLY. THE SHIPPING AND AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED AS SCHEDULED. BONN DID NOT RECEIVE ONWARD FLIGHT PERMISSION FOR TOKYO. LETTERS WERE EXCHANGED ESTABLISHING A JOINT ECONOMIC COMMISSION.

2. SCHMIDT'S EXPOSURE TO THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP IN PEKING WAS EXTENSIVE. HE CAME AWAY WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT TENG HSIAO PING IS IN FIRM CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT. IN HIS PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH TENG, SCHMIDT WAS INVITED TO EXPOUND ON THE WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION, WHICH HE DID FLUENTLY AND AT GREAT LENGTH. THE FOREIGN OFFICE BELIEVES THAT THE CHINESE WERE IMPRESSED.

3. SCHMIDT'S SCHEDULE OUTSIDE OF PEKING--VISITS TO NANKING AND URUMCHI -- WERE STRICTLY TOURIST PROGRAMS. THE FOREIGN OFFICE SAID THAT THE WELL-PUBLICIZED VISIT TO SINKIANG REALLY AMOUNTED TO A CROWDED AND TIRING CEREMONIAL EVENT.

4. TENG TOOK ADVANTAGE OF SCHMIDT'S PRESENCE IN PEKING TO ATTACK SHARPLY AND PUBLICLY BOTH THE USSR AND DETENTE. HOWEVER, HIS ATTACKS WERE ALONG ESTABLISHED CHINESE POLICY LINES AND THE FRG FOUND NOTHING NEW IN THEM. IN HIS PRIVATE TALKS WITH SCHMIDT, TENG CONCENTRATED ON CRITICIZING DETENTE, SPECIFICALLY DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, THE US-USSR GRAIN DEAL, AND AN ALLEGED \$7 BILLION TOTAL WORTH OF CREDITS EXTENDED BY THE WEST

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TO THE USSR.

5. TENG ALSO VOICED SUPPORT FOR THE US PRESENCE IN EUROPE, AS WELL AS IN THE PACIFIC. HE SPECIFICALLY SAID THAT PEKING RECOGNIZES THE NEED FOR AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES. TENG DID SAY, HOWEVER, THAT HE BELIEVES THE US IS OVERCOMMITTED IN THE WORLD.

6. SCHMIDT FOUND THE CHINESE TO BE INTERESTED IN THE PROBLEMS OF THE THIRD WORLD, ESPECIALLY THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE. HERE TENG SAID THAT THE CENTRAL QUESTION IS THE LOSS OF THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES' POSITION IN THE THIRD WORLD AND WHAT CHANGES THIS DEVELOPMENT WILL BRING.

7. TENG ALSO TOLD SCHMIDT THAT WORLD WAR III IS DEFINITELY COMING WITHIN TEN TO THIRTY YEARS. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY WORRIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS INCREASING IN STRENGTH. HOWEVER, HE VOICED NO FEAR OF AN ATTACK

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TRSE-00 XMB-02 AGR-05 OMB-01 /105 W

----- 043561

P R 071122Z NOV 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4185

INFO USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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AMCONSUL STUTTGART

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ON CHINA BY THE SOVIET UNION IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

8. SCHMIDT REPLIED TO TENG BY STRONGLY REAFFIRMING THE GERMAN-AMERICAN ALLIANCE, NATO AND THE STRENGTH OF EUROPE. SCHMIDT REMINDED TENG THAT SINCE THE USSR HAD DIVIDED GERMANY, HE NEEDED NO WARNINGS ABOUT THE RUSSIANS OR ENCOURAGEMENT TO MAINTAIN HIS VIGILANCE.

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AS EXPECTED, TENG SUPPORTED EUROPEAN UNIFICATION. HOWEVER, HIS WELCOMING REMARK THAT GERMANY'S ROLE IS TO RULE OVER ALL OF EUROPE WAS TOO STRONG FOR HIS GERMAN GUESTS.

9. SCHMIDT AND HIS COLLEAGUES CAME AWAY FROM PEKING NOT SURE OF HOW WELL TENG AND THE OTHER CHINESE LEADERS KNOW THE REAL WORLD SITUATION. HE URGED TENG TO VISIT EUROPE AND EXPAND HIS CONTACTS WITH THE WEST. TENG GAVE SCHMIDT THE IMPRESSION THAT HE MAY VISIT EUROPE SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE.

10. COMMENT: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SCHMIDT'S VISIT IS LIMITED. SCHMIDT ACCOMPLISHED WHAT HE SET OUT TO DO: GAIN EXPOSURE TO THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP AND IDENTIFICATION WITHIN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AS THE MAN (INSTEAD OF STRAUSS) WHO CAN DEAL WITH CHINA.

11. BUT IT CANNOT HAVE CONSTITUTED AN EDIFYING EXPERIENCE. MUCH OF THE TIME, SCHMIDT AND HIS HOSTS TALKED PAST EACH OTHER. WHEN THEY TALKED AT EACH OTHER, THEY OFTEN DISAGREED.

12. IT IS MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO ASSESS CHINESE MOTIVES BEHIND THE VISIT. IF THEY WERE TRYING TO USE THE FRG AGAINST THE USSR, THE FRG CANNOT NOW BE USED FOR SUCH PURPOSES AND ITS PRESENT LEADERSHIP WOULD NOT WISH IT TO BE SO USED. WHATEVER RHETORIC THE CHINESE EMPLOY, THE FRG CAN ILL AFFORD TO BE DRAWN INTO THIS GAME.

13. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AGREEMENTS SIGNED DURING THE VISIT IS PRACTICALLY NIL. PERHAPS THE PROSPECTS FOR AN INCREASE IN GERMAN EXPORTS WERE ENHANCED, BUT CERTAINLY NOT ENOUGH TO MERIT FOUR DAYS OF THE CHANCELLOR'S TIME.

14. CHINESE SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNION AND STRENGTH, AS IRRELEVANT AS IT IS, WOULD BE WELCOME TO THE FRG IF IT WERE NOT SO OVERLOADED WITH ANTI-SOVIET OVERTONES AND POTENTIAL FOR SOVIET REACTION AGAINST THE FRG. IN FACT, THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE FRG MAY IRRITATE THE  
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SOVIET UNION WHEN ITS LEADERS TRAVEL TO PEKING AND SUBJECT THEMSELVES TO ANTI-SOVIET RHETORIC MAY TURN OUT TO BE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RESULT OF SCHMIDT'S VISIT. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHAT BENEFITS SCHMIDT OBTAINED FROM CHOOSING TO RUN THIS RISK.

15. A MINISTER OF STATE IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE TOLD US THAT HE BELIEVES THE FRG CAN PLAY SOME KIND OF BALANCING ROLE BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA. HE SAW SOME ENCOURAGEMENT IN THE FACT THAT THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR DID NOT WALK OUT OF THE PEKING DINNER FOR SCHMIDT WHEN TENG BEGAN HIS ANTI-SOVIET REMARKS. INSTEAD, THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR BUSILY ENGAGED HIMSELF IN TALKING TO HIS NEIGHBOR IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO PRETEND THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD WHAT TENG SAID. THE GERMAN OFFICIAL CONCLUDED THAT THIS SHOWED THE RUSSIANS PLACED ENOUGH VALUE ON THE GERMAN RELATIONSHIP THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO TOLERATE CERTAIN GERMAN MOVES TOWARD PEKING.

16. FOR THE GERMANS, CHINA CANNOT BE IGNORED. THE FRG IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED WITH PROBLEMS AND ISSUES THAT TRANSCEND THE EUROPEAN SCENE. IF IT WISHES TO EXPAND ITS WORLD ROLE, IT MUST FIND A WAY TO RECONCILE SOME RELATIONSHIP TOWARD CHINA WITH THE SIMPLE REALITY OF THE MASSIVE SOVIET PRESENCE ON PART OF GERMAN SOIL AND AT THE BORDERS OF THE FRG. SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO CHINA REPRESENTED A STEP IN THE EVOLUTION OF THAT POLICY. IT MAY HAVE COME TOO EARLY AND MANY QUESTIONS CAN BE RAISED ABOUT THE BENEFITS THAT IT PRODUCED AS AGAINST THE PROBLEMS IT MAY HAVE CREATED. WE WOULD EXPECT THAT, AFTER THIS VISIT, THE FRG-CHINA RELATIONSHIP WILL RETURN TO A MORE QUIESCENT STATE. AFTER THAT, THE GERMANS WILL NEED TO DECIDE WHERE TO GO NEXT.  
END COMMENT.  
HILLENBRAND

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** MINISTERIAL VISITS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 07 NOV 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** ElyME  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975BONN18230  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750387-0709  
**From:** BONN  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19751165/aaaacfyu.tel  
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**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 75 BONN 16897, 75 BONN 17074  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** ElyME  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 23 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <23 APR 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <15 OCT 2003 by ElyME>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO CHINA  
**TAGS:** PFOR, GE, CH, (SCHMIDT, HELMUT)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006